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Risk, Bankruptcy 1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2001 Swissair debacle, Oliver Hart noted that Swis-
sair, until recently one of the world’s most respected airlines, could probably
have been saved if a mechanism had been in place to engineer a coordination
among all lenders, thereby avoiding the run on debtor assets [see Hart 2001].
In this paper we investigate a …nancial institution, the bank pool, that is able
to eliminate the risk of a corporate run, and that is common in the German
…nancial system. The bank pool is a new institution in the sense that to
the best of our knowledge it has not been studied thoroughly by economists
before, and it is widely unknown, even among scholars of corporate …nance.
Much of the recent literature on the pricing of debt, on the design of debt
contracts and, with a broader perspective, on the properties of the banking
system, builds on a common theme, that is the borrower-lender bargaining
process when …rms are in distress, and its implications for the …nancing of
the …rm. Two strands of the literature have focussed their attention on the
issue of lender coordination. Bolton and Scharfstein [1996] o¤er an explana-
tion of why …rms will choose more than one creditor. Multiple lenders have
the advantage of lowering the …rm’s incentive to default strategically, and
therefore increase the ex-ante probability of proper and timely repayment of
debt. On the other hand, multiple lenders have the disadvantage of lower-
ing expected payo¤ in liquidity default. However, the disadvantage can be
reduced if lenders commit themselves to a voting rule concerning asset sale
decisions. In a di¤erent setting, Morris and Shin [1999] analyze the common
pool problem of multiple lenders in corporate distress. E¢cient investment
and liquidation decisions are not automatically guaranteed, since the incen-
tives of lenders follow private rather than public welfare maximization. With
many lenders, coordinated behavior is not easily achieved. The risk of coor-
dination failure will be anticipated by borrowers and lenders. Coordination
risk is a variant of the common pool problem, similar in spirit to Diamond
and Dybvig’s [1983] bank run problem.
In this paper, we test empirically the value of lender coordination, relying
on a unique data set that contains detailed credit …le information sampled
from distressed clients of six leading German banks. It contains a compre-
hensive array of lending-related data on medium-sized corporates that were
in distress at least once during the period 1992-1997. The basic objective of
our study will be to explore how banks behave in the event of a corporate
distress. The major questions asked are: ”Do banks systematically coordi-
nate their interests, and if so, how is lender coordination achieved? Second,
and most importantly, what real economic consequences are associated with
lender coordination, and what are its major determinants? Finally, is the
2success of a workout predictable, and if so, which determinants matter?”.
We …nd that over the past decades the banking industry in Germany has
developed a widely accepted and …ne-tuned contractual arrangement that
harmonizes lender interests in the event of borrower distress. This uni…ca-
tion of interests is achieved by forming a so-called ”bank pool”. Our data
set allows us to identify when these pools are formed and what impact they
exert on workout, in particular, on workout success. We will argue that the
sustainability of the institution bank pool is closely related to the structure
of the insolvency code, with signi…cant di¤erences between the German code
and the US code (Chapter 11).
The main empirical results of this study suggest that multiple lending
is widespread among medium-sized …rms in Germany, and that explicit co-
ordination among these lenders starting at the onset of …nancial distress is
very common. Coordination is typically achieved through the formation of
bank pools. These pools aim at the reorganization of the common distressed
borrower. Bank pools with few member banks signi…cantly increase the like-
lihood of a successful turnaround during a reorganization process, whereas
pools with many member banks tend to decrease turnaround probability, ex-
tending the time needed to resolve distress. The formation of the pool itself
depends on the severity of the initial distress shock, the number of …rm’s
bank relationships and their heterogeneity in terms of debt outstanding.
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 gives a brief account of the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature and motivates our special interest in the
question of lender coordination. Section 3 lays out the institutional details of
the bank pool and discusses the typical contract design. Section 4 states our
major hypotheses. Section 5 describes the data set in some detail, including
the clients’ debt structure and the occurrence and structure of bank pools.
Section 6 derives the main results. Section 7 discusses our …ndings, relating
them to the structure of the insolvency code.
2 Review of the literature
Under complete contracting, the standard theory of debt leaves no room for
the renegotiation of contracts. In contrast, if contracts are incomplete owing
to unveri…able information, contracts may be renegotiated. In these incom-
plete contracting models, information is typically assumed to be observable
to both parties, the lender and the borrower, while it is unobservable to third
parties. Lenders face di¢culties enforcing their claims in court. Borrowers,
on the other side, cannot easily switch to other lenders since outsiders do not,
or only at cost, observe return realizations. This leads to two types of moral
3hazard problems, namely strategic default and hold up. The former describes
the incentive to default strategically by repudiating debt payments despite
project returns being su¢ciently high. The second refers to the lender ex-
ploiting his informational monopoly acquired over time, and charging above
the fair rate in later periods.
The borrower’s incentive to default strategically and renegotiate terms of
the debt contract is analyzed by Hart and Moore [1998] in a model of a single-
lending relationship and exogenous division of the parties’ bargaining power
in renegotiation. From di¤erent theoretical modelling approaches it has be-
come the common perception that the moral hazard risk of strategic default,
which may lead to an underinvestment problem, can be overcome by multiple
lending relationships which represent debt that is harder to renegotiate, or
even non-renegotiable. Bergman and Callen [1991] accredit public debt, seen
as non-renegotiable due to free-rider problems, as an e¤ective self-binding
commitment device of the …rm not to default strategically. However, even if
the …rm is able to renegotiate with multiple lenders, Bolton and Scharfstein
[1996] and Bergloef, Roland and von Thadden [2000] demonstrate in di¤erent
ways that the increased bargaining power of multiple lenders in renegotiation
lets strategic default look less attractive to the …rm.
Besides the deterrence of strategic default, multiple lending relationships
are also a powerful instrument for avoiding the second source of moral haz-
ard, namely hold up. Rajan [1992] addresses the issue of hold up and demon-
strates in his model that the value of …nancial ‡exibility provided by a rela-
tionship lender has to be weighted against the monopoly bargaining power
of the single lender derived from its monitoring function.
It is obvious that multiple lending can also impede renegotiation when it
is actually e¢ciency-enhancing. All the papers enumerated so far recognize
that the bene…ts of multiple lending come at a cost and one has to …nd a
t r a d eo ¤ .T h ec o m m o ns o u r c eo ft h ec o s ti na l lm o d e l si sas t a t eo fl o wr e t u r n
realization in which the …rm is not able to meet its contractual repayment
obligations. Hence, the so-called liquidity default is inevitable. Ine¢ciencies
arise from the inability to renegotiate multiple debt, higher cost of renegotia-
tion, or reduced expected liquidation values. Rajan [1992] and Bergman and
Callen [1991] argue that ine¢ciencies in liquidity default stem from free-rider
problems. An increase in the number of lenders lowers the probability that a
single lender is pivotal in renegotiation. Hence, especially small lenders have
an incentive to free ride. In the two-period model of Bolton and Scharfstein
[1996], debt will not be renegotiated in liquidity default situations. Here the
…rm cannot credibly commit to repay debt out of future returns due to the
unveri…able nature of returns. However, multiple lenders render liquidation
of assets more di¢cult, too. Modelling liquidation as a bargaining game
4between lenders and an outside investor, the increased bargaining power of
multiple lenders deters outside investors. Although the lenders’ payo¤ from
bargaining is increasing in the number of lenders, the probability that an out-
side investor actually enters into the bargaining process is decreasing, and so
is the expected liquidation payo¤ received by lenders.
In a second group of papers, it is argued that the major problem asso-
ciated with multiple lending is due to bargaining problems among lenders
rather than between lenders and a common borrower. The common pool
or collective action problem addresses the risk of coordination failure. Al-
though renegotiation is in the collective interest of all creditors, individually
they may …nd pre-emptive debt collection favorable. They will tend to fore-
close on their loans in fear of similar actions by other lenders although the
…rm’s prospects may in fact be sound. Underinvestment will be the conse-
quence. Multiple self-ful…lling equilibria arise, which resemble a bank run
as modelled by Diamond and Dybvig [1983]. Morris and Shin [1999] apply
the idea of coordination risk to corporate debt and its pricing. A number of
papers including Brown [1989], Bebchuk and Chang [1992], Schwartz [1997],
and Longhofer and Peters [1999] discuss how the risk of coordination failure
can be overcome by the implementation of optimal bankruptcy procedures.
It is thus an important question whether, …rst, lender coordination can
equally successfully be reached through informal, private arrangements and,
second, what are the institutional prerequisites for this to happen. Bolton
and Scharfstein [1996] demonstrate that a majority voting rule imposed on
creditor decisions will support coordination. It will constrain creditor bar-
gaining power and increase expected liquidation payo¤. The occurrence of
bank pools as a common instrument in German corporate lending demon-
strates that lender coordination can be reached outside court supervision. It
thereby substitutes for a formal, court-supervised reorganization procedure
which was lacking under the former German bankruptcy code (”Konkursor-
dnung”), in force until end of 1998. As an institutional prerequisite we can
identify a complimentary element of the insolvency code, the unconditional
status of privately agreed seniority rights. Uncontestable seniority is absent
from the US bankruptcy code, which might explain why we do not …nd the
same degree of bank involvement in private workouts when comparing Ger-
many and the US.
To date, the papers providing empirical results on the topic build ex-
clusively on US data. They compare formal procedures under Chapter 11
of the US Bankruptcy Reform Act with informal, private reorganizations of
distressed …rms. Gilson, John and Lang [1990] study the characteristics of
169 …nancially distressed US …rms. About half of these …rms have restruc-
tured their outstanding debt privately, while the other half sought protection
5under Chapter 11. Their …ndings suggest that …rms are more likely to re-
structure privately when they have more intangible assets, a relatively high
going-concern value, and owe more to banks and to fewer lenders. Franks
and Torous 1994 compare private restructuring, organized as an exchange
o¤er, with Chapter 11 reorganizations. Their analysis shows that recovery
rates are on average higher in private restructuring. Deviations from ab-
solute priority are more likely in private restructuring. In contrast to the
results of Franks and Torous [1994], Gilson [1997] …nds transaction costs of
private restructuring to be relatively high compared to Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations. The author’s reasoning on low transaction costs under Chapter 11
includes majority voting, compared to unanimity requirements out of court,
and reduced information asymmetries between the …rm and its investors.
Moreover, Chapter 11 o¤ers more ‡exibility in choosing a new capital struc-
ture, whereas leverage remains high in a private workout. Asquith, Gertner
and Scharfstein [1994] analyze distressed issuers of high-yield junk bonds.
They …nd that banks restructure out-of-court by either loosening …nancial
constraints, e.g. deferring principal or interest and/or providing fresh money,
or by tightening, e.g. reducing credit lines and/or increasing collateral. How-
ever, the bank’s willingness to make concessions is limited, even more so when
the bank’s debt is secured, since public creditors participate in the gains of
restructuring.
Our own empirical analysis in this paper studies private reorganizations
and the coordination among creditors in a creditor-friendly legal environ-
ment. The analysis is related to Gilson, John, and Lang [1990]. Like them,
we analyze a sample of …nancially distressed …rms, and we identify explana-
tory variables for the incidence of lender coordination and for the success of
private workouts. Unlike them, however, we concentrate on private rather
than public debt restructuring under the German bankruptcy code. In con-
trast to the US code, private contractual arrangements in Germany remain
uncontested even when formal court proceedings are under way. For our
study, we use …rst-hand credit-…le data of banks involved in the restructur-
ing of distressed borrowers. Furthermore, we explicitly address the question
of lender coordination, or the failure thereof, and relate it to the special
features of the German insolvency code.
3 The microstructure of bank pools
While collecting our data set, we became aware of an institutional arrange-
ment that serves the purpose of coordinating lender decision-making in the
event of a borrower distress. The so called ”bank pools” are formal con-
6tractual arrangements in which a group of bank lenders pool their individual
claims vis-à-vis a particular borrower. These pools appear to be widely used
in German banking, but they are little known outside banking circles and
have not yet been analyzed by economists. The basic institutional features of
these pools will be described in this section, descriptive statistics will follow
in section 5.
The standard pool contract has been used throughout the last thirty
years. Its special format is adapted to the needs of distress situations, which
are relevant for our data set. Core elements of the standard pool contract
are as follows:
² a list of contracting parties and outstanding loans,
² a description of pool leader responsibilities, including the administra-
tion of collateral;
² an agreement as to the joint and mutual settlement of credit account
balances between participating banks;
² an agreement as to the distribution of revenues from liquidation or
ongoing client business;
² a sharing rule concerning the costs of running the pool;
² a sharing arrangement concerning relevant default information, and
² an agreement as to the duration of the contract, and exit rules.
An abbreviated English version of the standard pool contract is in Ap-
pendix 1 [see Scholz and Lwowski 1994, and Hellner and Steuer 2001 for a
complete German text].
The pool contract establishes a binding commitment for every bank to
coordinate its client-related actions with all other pool banks. Most impor-
tantly, each bank commits itself to keep its credit line open and to refrain from
any line reduction. Thus, the seizure of collateral or any forced repayment
is ruled out, unless the pool members decide unanimously to the contrary.
In general, revenues from client’s ongoing business, or from the realization of
collateral are shared among pool banks in proportion to their relevant credit
balances. If banks learn individually about circumstances that endanger the
repayment of debt, information has to be shared among all pool banks and,
therefore, the otherwise rigid rule of bank secrecy is lifted.
From …eld interviews, supported by our data, we know that only uncol-
lateralized junior loans are pooled. Collateralized creditors’ participation in
7the pool corresponds to the uncollateralized portion of their debt. Thus, ju-
nior lenders will bear the burden of a workout since fresh money is typically
provided by the pool according to pre-speci…ed pool quotas. This scenario
has been observed throughout decades since bank pools were established. It
is important to mention that this scenario does not at all imply that senior
banks, notably collateralized housebanks, are left out of pool negotiations
altogether. The reason is that even housebanks typically have part of their
loans unsecured. Furthermore, banks have an informal stand-still agree-
ment regarding the collateralized (non-pooled portion) of their debt which,
although not contractually binding, is apparently su¢cient to prevent pre-
emptive action by these parties. Once a pool exists, additional attempts are
made to collateralize new and outstanding junior pool loans. This explains
the existence of collateralized pool loans.
4 H y p o t h e s e so nb a n kp o o l sa n dr e o r g a n i z a -
tion
The strands of the literature reviewed in the preceding sections have made
clear that renegotiation of loans is a function of the number of lenders. Bolton
and Scharfstein [1996] and Rajan [1992], among others, view multiple lending
as a commitment device not to renegotiate. This is e¢ciency-enhancing if
strategic default can be avoided. On the other hand, ine¢ciencies from multi-
ple lending arise in liquidity default states, since renegotiation or liquidation
becomes more expensive when multiple lenders are involved.
A second argument is put forward by Morris and Shin [1999]. With
many lenders, successful renegotiation requires coordination among lenders.
In particular, it requires a commitment to continue the …nancial relationship
with a …nancially distressed but economically sound …rm. The risk of pre-
emptive termination of loans and the early seizure of collateral may lead to
an ine¢cient outcome here.
We view bank pools as coordination devices that attempt to align the
incentives of multiple lenders when their common debtor is in distress. In
order to understand the economics behind this contractual institution, we
will model the pool formation decision …rst, and its impact on the success of
reorganization afterwards.
84.1 Determinants of pool formation
Pool formation is assumed to depend on three key factors, namely the num-
ber of bank relationships maintained by a single (distressed) borrower, the
importance of the free-riding incentive within the group of lenders, and the
severity of the distress event. These factors are explained in turn.
4.1.1 Number of bank relationships
First, following Bolton and Scharfstein [1996] and Rajan [1992], the number
of lenders will in‡uence the likelihood of pool formation. Disregarding any
costs, the larger the number of lenders, the higher the value of a bank pool
in distress. Thus, a large number of banks should increase banks’ incentive
to form a pool. However, balancing of costs and bene…ts of multiple lending
may explain a negative impact of a large number of bank relationships on
the probability of pool formation.
4.1.2 Distribution of lending shares among lenders
Second, workout activities are of a public good nature. They entail private
costs, while possible bene…ts are shared among all lenders, irrespective of
their involvement in the reorganization. We postulate that free-riding in-
centives become large when the lending share of one creditor is signi…cantly
bigger than the shares of all other creditors. Small lenders will free-ride by
refusing to participate in a pool and relying on the large lender’s incentive to
attempt workout individually. Thus, the more heterogeneous the distribution
of lending shares, the lower is the probability of pool formation.
4.1.3 Severity of the distress shock
Third, the severity of the distress shock should be positively related to the
probability of pool formation, since only strong shocks will unambiguously be
interpreted as signals of distress by all lenders. And it is only in situations
of fundamental distress that pooling of interest is warranted because, as
was made clear by Bolton and Scharfstein [1996], renegotiations between the
…rm and a pool of lenders decreases a single pool bank’s bargaining power
in strategic default situations. Thus, if the rating which de…nes the onset of
the distress period (i.e. the …rst negative rating for a given borrower during
our observation window) is a 6, the worst rating notch, rather than a 5, the
9formation of a pool should be easier. The reason is that it should be easier
for any given lender to convince all remaining banks of the necessity to form
a pool if the economic situation as described by the rating has markedly
worsened. In a univariate sense, the initial distress rating (i.e. 5 or 6) is
expected to be positively related to the probability of pool formation.
4.1.4 Control variables
Borrower size Given that a bank pool involves coordination costs, the
banks’ decision on pool formation also depends on the size of the borrower.
We measure size in terms of …rm’s total assets. Total assets should have an
impact on expected future revenues out of which banks’ costs will have to
be reimbursed. We therefore hypothesize that …rm size is positively related
to the probability of pool formation. Furthermore, including borrower size
enables us to control for the possibility that also the number of banks proxies
size rather than coordination issues.
Housebank and collateralization The housebank is not likely to be a
driving force in forming a bank pool. Given its senior position in terms of
collateral, as was shown by Elsas and Krahnen [2000], and given its superior
information status, the housebank stands to lose less than the other banks
from an ine¢cient liquidation of …rm’s assets due to coordination failure.
Note that the housebank status and the degree of collateralization are mutu-
ally reinforcing factors in this regard. Both variables will be included in the
regression.
Bank identity Finally, there may well be systematic di¤erences between
banks in our sample with respect to their willingness to engage in a bank pool.
Recall that the banks in our sample comprise the biggest banks from all three
German banking sectors, namely private banks, savings banks (mostly owned
by communities), and cooperative banks. Thus, policy di¤erences between
institutions may well play a role here.
4.2 Determinants of workout success
4.2.1 Bank pool
Once a bank pool is established, participants are committed to the coor-
dination of behavior amongst all pool members. According to Morris and
Shin [1999], the risk of coordination failure is then banished. Coordination
10among lenders in the sense of Bergman and Callen [1991] also prevents free-
riding, which could otherwise block reorganization. Following Bergloef et al.
[2000] and Bolton and Scharfstein [1996], high reorganization costs of multi-
ple lenders can be reduced when lenders coordinate and commit themselves
via, e.g. speci…c voting procedures. Summarizing the above arguments, the
existence of a bank pool should render the success of reorganization more
likely.
4.2.2 Number of bank relationships
Due to free-rider problems, the probability of successful renegotiation of debt
in a distress situation is expected to be negatively related to the number of
lenders [see Bergman and Callen 1991, and Hege 1997]. This is caused by the
low probability of each individual lender being pivotal for the …rm’s failure.
We thus hypothesize that a larger number of bank relationships decreases
the probability of workout success.
Given that a bank pool is formed, the number of extant bank relationships
may serve as a proxy for pool size. However, there are con‡icting bargaining
incentives among the di¤erent …nanciers of a distressed …rm. Our a-priori
belief is that bargaining costs are directly proportional to the number of
banks in a pool. The main reason for this belief lies in the incentive of small
creditors to deny concessions, or in general to be less actively involved in a
restructuring process and, therefore, to be less committed to timely action.
In comparison to pools with a small number of members, ”large” pools are
expected to need more time for decision-making. Stretching a workout over
time may be costly in terms of opportunity costs as well as in terms of options
foregone. Furthermore, since ”large” pools are less prepared to act ‡exibly,
they are likely to liquidate distressed …rms more often than ”small” pools.
In this regard, ”large” pools bear some similarity to a group of bondholders.
4.2.3 Housebank status
While we have a clear prediction for the e¤ect of a bank pool on workout
success, we have no such hypothesis for the housebank relationship. There
are counteracting e¤ects to consider. On the one hand, a better informed
housebank may be able to implement the timing and the sequencing of work-
out decisions more e¢ciently. By the same token, it is more likely to get the
menu of actions right, given its intimate knowledge of the borrower’s history.
On the other hand, once distress has become public, every lender will collect
more information about the borrower in order to prepare a possible workout.
In particular, if a bank pool has been formed, the informational advantage
11of the housebank is shared by the pool. For all these reasons the unique
position held by a housebank in normal times is likely to be weakened in
distress periods. We therefore do not expect the housebank variable to have
considerable explanatory power with respect to workout success.
5 T h eC F SD i s t r e s s e dL o a nD a t aS e t
5.1 General characteristics of the data set
This study relies on the CFS Loan Data Set, collected under the Center for
Financial Studies’ …eld research project on Credit Management [see Elsas et
al. 1998 for a detailed description]. The data underlying our analysis include
distressed and potentially distressed corporate debtors of the following six
major German banks: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, Bay-
erische Vereinsbank (now HypoVereinsbank), DG-Bank (Deutsche Genossen-
schaftsbank, now DZ-Bank), and WestLB (Westdeutsche Landesbank). The
unit of observation is a particular …rm or, more speci…cally, a particular
bank-…rm relationship, using all information regarding the …rm contained in
the credit …les of a bank. The data set contains in particular
² general characteristics of the borrowing …rm (e.g. legal form, industry);
² a time series of …rm’s balance sheet data (up to 7 years);
² an assessment of borrower risk, according to the bank’s internal risk
rating;
² a complete account of all outstanding loans from the respective bank,
including data on loan terms, e.g. volume, maturity, collateral, spread;
² general information concerning other bank relationships, including the
existence of a bank pool;
² a complete time-stamped list of measures taken by the bank in order
to reorganize or liquidate the …rm, or its assets.
This information was collected directly from the banks’ credit …les. Ob-
servations range from 1991 up to 1999. The sample was randomly drawn
from a population of all corporate customers who met the following set of
conditions at least once during 1992-1997, where borrowers whose relation-
ship started after 1992, or was terminated before 1997, are included.
12² First, companies had to be medium-sized, i.e. with an annual turnover
between DM 50-500m (EUR 25-250m). Due to the absence of surveil-
lance by rating agencies and the lack of rigorous disclosure require-
ments, we expected this company size segment to be subject to a signif-
icant degree of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers,
thus constituting a prime population for the analysis of issues related
to relationship lending, loan contract design, and renegotiation.
² Second, to ensure a minimum level of information regarding the clients’
total bank debt and the number of the borrower’s bank relationships, a
minimum total loan size of DM 3m (EUR 1.5m) was imposed. All loans
surpassing DM 3m are subject to the regulatory noti…cation require-
ment of Article 14 of the KWG (German Banking Act), and have to be
communicated to the federal banking supervisory agency (BAKred).
² Third, clients with registered o¢ces in the former GDR (East Germany)
were excluded.
² Fourth, to generate a sample of potentially distressed borrowers, a ran-
dom selection was chosen from the set of …rms that had recorded a
poor internal credit rating at least once within the 1992-1997 period.
The rating re‡ects the expected default probability of the …rm, as seen
by the bank, before collateralization is taken into account1.A p o o r
rating is de…ned as a rating of 5 or 6 on a standardized rating scale
ranging from 1 (highest grade) to 6 (lowest grade) for all banks in this
sample. Rating categories 5 and 6 indicate that banks expect the bor-
rower to be problematic, i.e. potentially distressed, or distressed. The
standardization process is described in section 5.4.
The generated sample includes 124 borrowers and a total number of year-
end observations2 of 597. Table 1 shows the frequencies of credit …les collected
from each bank.
Grouped according to industry sectors, Table 2 shows that the majority
of …rms come from the engineering (33) and manufacturing (30) sectors. The
1Internal ratings are typically derived from scoring models that measure …rm risk.
Furthermore, adjustments for collateralization are commonly made, though we rely on
raw ratings only.
2When there is more than one observation per year we only consider the last observa-
tion. However, we cumulate the information on distress measures taken by the bank over
all observations in the respective year.
13Bank3 123456 total
Frequency 16 30 14 16 28 20 124
Table 1: Number of observed borrowers per bank
third largest sector is trade, including both retail and wholesale, with a total
of 17 …rms in our data set. Other sectors are of rather minor importance in
this sample.
industry sector no. of sample …rms
engineering 33
manufacturing 30
trade4 17
construction 9
transportation 5
services 4
energy 4
others 22
total 124
Table 2: Sample …rms by industry sectors
5.2 Firm size and debt structure
The major sample selection criterion refers to company size, proxied by an-
nual sales, representing medium-sized companies. Annual sales had to be
larger than DM 50ma n ds m a l l e rt h a nD M500m( E U R25 ¡ 250m). In our
sample of 124 problematic and distressed …rms, the average company size is
DM 144:3m( E U R 72m), with a median of DM 104:1m. For this size class,
German …rms typically have not issued any public debt instruments. The
average debt-to-assets ratio is 70:82%, the bank-debt to total-debt ratio is
75:57%. The remainder comprises other forms of debt, e.g. trade credit and
debt given by owners. The fraction of bank debt in total debt is considerably
larger than the ratio in a comparable representative sample, where the av-
erage bank debt is about 50% of total debt. With respect to the number of
bank relationships, however, there is no signi…cant di¤erence between these
14samples5. As can be seen from Table 3, …rms tend to borrow from several
banks, with a mean value of 6 and a median of 5 (with a minimum of 1 and
a maximum of 30).
mean median std.dev.
annual turnover (m DM) (n = 121) 144:31 0 4 :11 3 9 :3
total assets (m DM) (n = 121) 121:26 9 :11 5 5 :9
total debt (m DM) (n = 121) 73:14 7 :08 6 :4
total bank debt (m DM) (n = 109) 61:73 6 :67 7 :8
debt-to-assets ratio (n =1 2 1 ) :7082 :7115 :2261
banks’ debt share (n = 107) :7557 :8122 :2532
number of banks (n = 123) 6:05 :04 :3
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on …rm size and debt structure
Additionally, we analyzed whether larger borrowers tend to have more
bank relationships and higher amounts of debt outstanding per bank. The
results, comprised in Table 4, suggest that both total bank debt and the
average debt per bank increase in …rm size as measured by either total assets
or annual turnover. The relationship between …rm size and the number of
banks lending to the …rm is positive as well, albeit with a smaller correlation
coe¢cient.
no. of banks total bank debt ; debt per bank
total assets :336¤
(n=120) :832¤
(n=107) :680¤
(n=107)
annual turnover :422¤
(n=120) :767¤
(n=107) :581¤
(n=107)
Table 4: Bivariate correlation between …rm size and size of bank debt
* p=0.01 level of signi…cance (two-tailed).
5.3 The identi…cation of housebanks
The housebank variable is assigned a value of one whenever decisions taken
by the bank in question were explained, in the credit …les, using arguments
5See Elsas and Krahnen [2000],and Machauer and Weber [1998] for descriptive statistics
relating to the representative sample.
15explicitly relating to its housebank status (e.g. ”we are the housebank”, ”we
are the main bank”, ”we have a special responsibility”, etc.), zero otherwise.
The resulting housebank attribution thus di¤ers substantially from other
measures of relationship intensity used in the literature, such as duration or
the number of bank lenders. We believe our attribution to be a more reliable
indicator, since it is directly based on the internal judgment of one of the
parties to the implicit contract. The sample of problematic or distressed
borrowers used in this study contains 45 housebank relationships and 79
non-housebank relationships. In Table 5, the number of bank relationships
is related to the housebank attribution.
housebank
01 total
#banks 1 077
2 ¡ 3 91 9 2 8
4 ¡ 7 46 14 60
8+ 23 5 28
total 78 45 123
(missing) (1) (0) (1)
mean 7:038 4:224 6:016
Table 5: Cross-table of housebank attribution and the number of banks
The mean number of bank relationships is signi…cantly higher in the case
of normal bank relationships than in the case of housebanks. About 77% of all
housebank relationships have at most 3 banks, while for normal relationships
this fraction is only 11:5%. Of course, it is likely that in a given normal
bank relationship there is a di¤erent bank acting as the relevant housebank,
although the probability may be smaller than one. Of course, the probability
to observe a housebank in our sample is decreasing in the number of bank
relationships.
5.4 Internal ratings
An important characteristic of our data set concerns internal ratings of lend-
ing institutions, since for none of the …rms in our sample do we have evidence
of external ratings from agencies such as Dunn&Bradstreet. The rating in-
formation has been collected on every borrower and for each observation
recorded in the …les. Each bank in our sample uses its own rating system in
16order to assess the probability of default by its borrowers at regular intervals,
i.e. every two years for high-graded …rms and at least once a year for …rms
of medium and low quality, and whenever information crucial to the …rm’s
creditworthiness is revealed. Low-quality …rms are commonly observed to be
r a t e de v e nm o r ef r e q u e n t l y .
The standard methodology of the rating process relies on a scoring system
with up to …ve di¤erent main criteria, including quantitative and qualitative
information about …rm performance and prospects, and a linear weighting
system with both …xed and varying weighting factors depending on the bank
in question [see Brunner, Krahnen, and Weber 2000 for details].
Ratings are believed to re‡ect expected default probabilities, as seen by
the banks, as an unbiased estimate. As long as internal ratings remain the
private information of the bank, i.e. as long as rating information is not
communicated to either the management of the rated …rm, or to some su-
pervisory body, there is no inherent incentive for the bank to misrepresent
the information available systematically. Internal ratings are thus expected
to be informationally e¢cient [see Krahnen and Weber 2001].
In the subsequent empirical analysis we assume internal ratings to be
e¢cient and unbiased. The ratings of di¤erent banks representing di¤erent
rating scales have been standardized in a transformed rating scale with six
rating categories, in which grades 5 and 6 describe borrowers that are either
potentially distressed (problematic), or actually distressed. The standardiza-
tion process is based on the bank-individual rating categories and their ver-
bal descriptions taken from the banks’ rating manuals guiding credit o¢cers
when to assign a …rm to a certain rating category. Using these descriptions
each category of a bank-individual rating system was assigned to one of the
six new categories of the standardized system [see Table 15 in Appendix 2].
Figure 2 in Appendix 2 shows the frequency distributions of client ratings of
the …ve banks on the standardized rating scale for a representative sample
of 1996 data (n = 101). Obviously, the frequency distributions of ratings
across the banks appear to be similar, although Bank 2 seems to have clients
with better internal ratings on average6. Bank-speci…c credit policies may
be responsible for this observation, rather than an incorrect calibration of
the rating scale. In particular, two banks may assign identical ratings to
the same client, but di¤er w.r.t. the average internal rating of their client
pools due to di¤erent lending policies. In the case of Bank 2, for example,
credit o¢cers were explicitly instructed to minimize the number of low-rated
6Based on a Â2-homogeneity test applied to the frequency distributions of banks 1,3,4,5
we cannot reject the hypothesis that all ratings come from the same distribution. Adding
the internal ratings of bank 2 leads to a rejection of this hypothesis.
17customers. Other banks maintain close relationships with their clients and
rather adjust prices in order to make up for the increase in default risk.
5.5 Credit Event
The time when a borrower’s internal rating is downgraded by the bank to a
standardized rating class of 5 or 6 for the …rst time in our data set is labeled
the credit event. The credit event thus describes the onset of …nancial dis-
tress. For some of the banks in our sample, the credit event corresponds with
the time when competence for a certain client is transferred from the local
credit authority to the workout group on the regional level (other banks may
not have implemented such workout groups). The workout group has speci…c
expertise regarding the reorganization, and also liquidation, of borrowers. At
the onset of …nancial distress, the event rating, which can either be rating
class 5 or 6, also measures the severity of the distress shock. In our sample,
we …nd 101 rating downgrades to rating 5 and 23 rating downgrades to rating
6 where the latter may also include cases in which liquidation starts right
away.
5.6 Bank behavior in distress
The onset of …nancial distress measured by the credit event typically goes
along with the bank adjusting its behavior vis-à-vis the …rm to the new
information. Bank measures in a distress situation may include:
² loosening the …rm’s …nancial constraints by postponing due repayments
and interest payments or even providing additional funds (fresh money)
to help the …rm overcome a liquidity shortage.
² tightening the …rm’s …nancial constraints by reducing credit lines, ter-
minating individual loans or requiring additional collateral in order to
discipline the …rm’s management.
However, loosening and tightening measures are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The bank may, for example, provide fresh money and require addi-
tional collateral at the same time. Additionally, the bank reacts to declining
borrower quality in ways not directly related to the size and structure of loan
agreements, for instance by increasing its monitoring. The term ’workout’
is commonly used to describe the bank’s e¤ort to carry on the lending re-
lationship to a distressed or potentially distressed borrower. It may include
18the postponement of repayments due, fresh money, reorganization plans, and
advisory services.
As argued in previous sections, the bank pool can be seen as a coordinat-
ing device, facilitating the reorganization of distressed …rms. In 7 cases (out
of 101 in the data set), distressed …rms are immediately liquidated, two of
which using formal bankruptcy proceedings. In 11 additional cases, the …rm
is liquidated after attempts to reorganize it had failed. Thus, there are 18
liquidations altogether in sample, 6 of which …led for bankruptcy.
5.6.1 Collateralization
Collateralization of outstanding loans is relevant information once a lender
has to decide how to behave in distress situations since it considerably a¤ects
the payout scheme. Furthermore, collateralization plays an important role in
setting up a bank pool which comprises only unsecured loans. In our distress
sample, the share of loans collateralized when distress occurs amounts to
45:42% on average7 [see Table 6] and is therefore higher than collateralization
of assets in a representative sample8.
collateralization (n = 74)
t ¡ 1 tt +1
mean 38:28 45:42 41:54
median 34:97 40:80 38:80
min 0:00 0:00 0:00
max 100:00 100:00 100:00
std.dev. 31:68 32:73 30:81
Table 6: Collateralization around the distress event
In addition, collateralization at distress event is higher than in the periods
before and after the event. However, changes in collateralization can be
explained by three factors: a re-evaluation of collateral assets, the acquisition
of additional assets, or a change in loan volume. Table 7 concentrates on the
value of collateral assets around the distress event thereby eliminating the
7The table comprises all cases out of 124 for which data on collateral is available for at
least one period ahead of and one period subsequent to the distress event.
8In 1996, the average collateralization of loans in a representative sample of 98 …rms
was 31.5%. See Elsas and Krahnen [2000] for further details.
19in‡uence of changes in outstanding bank debt. It reveals that collateral value
is slightly increasing around the distress event which suggests that banks
acquire additional collateral when borrower quality is declining. Thus, the
decrease in collateralization of about 4 percentage points in the distress event
can not be explained by a devaluation of collateral. Instead, banks seem to
hand out fresh money without getting the proportional amount of collateral
assets in return. However, one has to keep in mind that the data is highly
aggregated and the reliability of these conjectures therefore is weak.
collateral value (n =6 2 )9
t ¡ 1 tt +1
mean 93:54 100:00 100:82
median 100:00 100:00 95:48
min 0:00 100:00 0:00
max 250:00 100:00 618:81
std.dev. 57:03 0:00 84:13
Table 7: Collateral value around the distress event
5.7 Bank pool
Among the 124 …rms in the sample which are distressed or potentially dis-
tressed for at least some interval of our observation window, there are 58
credit relationships involving pool arrangements. In line with the hypothesis
that a poor initial distress rating enhances pool formation, Table 8 indicates
that a poor initial distress rating (notch 6)l e a d st op o o lf o r m a t i o ni n70%
of all cases, while a mild initial distress rating (notch 5) is accompanied by
p o o lf o r m a t i o ni no n l y40% of all cases.
However, bank behavior di¤ers with regard to individual bank’s partici-
pation in pools. Table 9 indicates that for 4 out of 6 banks (namely those
numbered 1, 2, 4, 6) participation in a bank pool can be observed in about
50% of all cases. Note that Bank 3 has considerably more pool relationships,
and Bank 5 has considerably less. Thus, in regression analysis it will be
necessary to control for the identity of the bank.
The number of housebanks observed in our sample which are also mem-
bers of a bank pool is less than proportional. Of the 58 bank pools we
20event rating
56 total
pool 0 59 7 66
1 42 16 58
total 101 23 124
Table 8: Cross-table of creditor pool and event rating
bank
123456 total
pool 0 81 62 82 21 06 6
1 81 4 1 28 61 05 8
total 16 30 14 16 28 20 124
Table 9: Cross-table of creditor pools and bank identity
observe, only 15 housebanks were involved, as far as we could observe. How-
ever, care must be exercised when interpreting this fact. There are 6 cases
in our sample where the housebank is the one and only lending institution.
Furthermore, even if the bank we observe is not a housebank but engaged in
a bank pool, another member bank might be a housebank for the borrower
in question.
The number of banks involved in a pool contract is a potentially relevant
piece of information. In the literature, it is frequently argued that the higher
the number of creditors, the more di¢cult it will be to achieve coordination.
We do not have complete information about the structure of the bank pool,
with respect to its size and the identity of its member banks and their relative
pool shares. However, we do know the total number of lending relationships.
This number will be used as a proxy for the number of pool banks. Recall
that the purpose of pool negotiations is to integrate all banks with active
lending relationships.
Figure 1 relates the incidence of bank pools to the number of bank rela-
tionships. It shows that the fraction of pool contracts is highest when the
number of bank relationships is between 4 and 7.T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e
view that coordination problems are increasing in the number of creditors,
thereby increasing the value of these pools. However, pools may be more
di¢cult to establish when the number of banks is large.
Although we could not record the size and the composition of bank pools
for all relationships in our sample, we do have these data for one particular
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Figure 1: The frequencies of pool and non-pool cases as a function of the
number of bank relationships (n=123)
institution, Bank 6. Table 10 will give the reader a …rst indication about the
bank’s role across di¤erent pools.
It is obvious from these numbers that neither is all outstanding debt
included in the pool, nor does the bank necessarily participate in the pool
with a share equivalent to its share in total bank debt. For …rms 6 ¡ 9 the
bank’s share in the pool is considerably larger than its fraction of total bank
debt, while it is smaller for …rm 5. The fraction of total bank debt covered
by the pool varies between 12% and 44%. These numbers support the results
of our …eld interviews, i.e. outstanding bank debt is only partially pooled.
Additional evidence comes from the 18 liquidations in the sample of 124
distressed …rms. While there are no pools among the cases that were im-
mediately liquidated, there were pools at work in 9 out of 11 cases where
reorganization e¤orts eventually failed, and …rms were liquidated. Thus,
bank pools seemingly aim at reorganization, but are not always successful.
22firm #banks bankdebt6 P
i bankdebti
pooldebt6 P
i pooldebti
pooldebt6
bankdebt6
P
i pooldebti P
i bankdebti
17 :: 25 :67 :
26 :: 26 :16 :
36 :26 :26 :16 :16
46 :: 23 :21 :
55 :19 :09 :06 :12
66 :15 :20 :25 :19
73 :36 :50 :22 :16
84 :44 :50 :51 :44
95 :15 :34 :93 :41
Table 10: Pool structure of Bank 6’s clients one period after the credit event
6 Estimation methodology and results
6.1 Methodology
After a brief description of the estimation procedures used in this study,
we will discuss the results of testing our hypotheses on pool formation, and
will then turn to workout success. Both regressions use cross-sectional data.
The regression on pool formation is a standard probit. The underlying la-
tent dependent variable is the probability of pool formation and the variable
actually observed is binary representing either ’pool formation’ or ’no pool
formation’ within our observation window. The set of explanatory variables
include both quantitative variables and qualitative dummy variables.10
The workout success regression is divided into three parts. The …rst part
consists of a probit regression similar in methodology to that applied to pool
formation. Here the latent dependent variable is the probability of work-
out success for which we observe realizations of a binomial process ’success’
or ’no success’ where the latter includes both failures and unresolved cases.
The set of explanatory variables again include qualitative and quantitative
variables. However, we now face the possibility of an endogeneity problem.
The endogeneity problem arises from the fact that the existence of a pool
which is shown to be endogenous in the very …rst regression, is among the
explanatory variables hypothesized to have an impact on the probability of
workout success. Error terms in both regression equations may be correlated
which we control for in the second part by using a two-stage estimation pro-
10For a variable description see Table 16 in Appendix 3.
23cedure suggested by Maddala [1983]. The model we are estimating is similar
to Maddala’s model 5 with mixed structure where both the latent variables
and their qualitative realizations enter into the model. In the third part we
use the time spent in distress as an alternative measure of workout success,
in contrast to the binary dependent variable of ’success’ or ’no success’ used
before. Accordingly, the estimation method used is a duration analysis where
the dependent variable is the time the client spends in distress.
6.2 Determinants of pool formation
The following regression analysis will help us understand the determinants
of pool formation. The sample used here consists of 101 observations where
we excluded relationships which we do not observe after the distress event11.
Firms with single bank relationships are included in the sample since there
is positive probability of pools formed by one bank and non-bank credi-
tors. The dependent variable is the pool-dummy variable, equal to one if a
bank pool has been formed and zero otherwise. The set of explanatory vari-
ables in model speci…cation (1:i) comprise the log of the number of banks,
log(#banks), as potential pool members. The skewness-variable proxies
for relative size of lender claims or, in other words, the heterogeneity of banks’
lending shares. skewness is small when the bank’s lending share roughly
equals the average share, i.e. one divided by #banks, and it increases if the
bank lends more or less than this.12
SKEWNESS =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
BANK0SD E B T
TOTALBANK DEBT
¡
1
#BANKS
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
rating6 measures the severity of the initial distress shock by assigning
av a l u eo f1 to all observations with a very poor initial distress rating (notch
6), and zero otherwise (notch 5). We include the housebank dummy hb in
11There are 23 …rms for which the distress event occurred in the last period of observa-
tion. The number of observations increased compared to an earlier version of the paper.
In contrast, when an observation is missing by the time of the distress event, e.g. the
number of bank relationships, we here use the closest observation as the best proxy.
12Compared to an earlier version of the paper, we rede…ned the SKEWNESS variable in
the sense that we use for both the observed bank as well as all banks the amount of debt
actually withdrawn by the …rm instead of the credit lines available. The reason is that
information on other banks’ credit lines are not always available whereas data on exposures
are collected by the supervisory agency BAKred and aggregated data is distributed to all
lending banks in return.
24our regression. hb is assigned the value 1 if the bank is a housebank to the
respective client and zero otherwise. The variable collateral measures
the collateralized portion of the bank’s loans with the client. The identity of
each of the six banks is included in the variables bank1, bank3, ..., bank6
(Bank 2 serves as the reference group here). The variable log(assets) mea-
sures …rm size which is included in model speci…cation (1:ii). We included
two industry dummies controlling for the engineering and the manufac-
turing sector and, …nally, two so-called time2end-dummies controlling for
the number of periods observed after the distress event, i.e. the time span
between the credit event and the end of the observation window. The results
of the probit analysis are shown in Table 11.
POOL= f
Ã
log(#BANKS);SKEWNESS;RATING6;HB;COLL;
BANK1:::6;logASSETS;INDUSTRY;TIME2END
!
(1)
The results reported in Table 11 indicate major determinants of pool
formation. First we direct our attention to the number of bank creditors as
an indicator of potential pool size. The coe¢cient of log(#banks) in the
pool regression is positive in both speci…cations, signi…cant at the 1% and
the 10% level respectively, telling us that it is more likely that a bank pool
is formed when the number of banks is high.
Besides the number of potential pool banks, their relative …nancing shares
have an impact on the probability of pool formation. We …nd the coe¢cient
of the skewness-variable to be negative and signi…cant at the 5% and the
1% level respectively, implying low skewness values (signifying similar …-
nancing shares among the banks) to be associated with a high probability of
pool formation. Of course, skewness is a rough proxy for the distribution of
lending shares among banks since it only compares the observed bank’s lend-
ing share with the average lending per bank, i.e. without precise information
of other banks’ lending …gures.
The rating6-variable can be identi…ed as a strong contributor in terms
of signi…cance. The coe¢cient of rating6 is positive and signi…cant at
the 5% level indicating that a large shock to the creditworthiness of the
borrower as expressed by the rating deterioration makes the formation of a
pool more likely. A possible explanation for the dependence of pool formation
on the rating class is that di¤erent lenders may have divergent opinions on
the severity of the borrower’s loss of quality. To form a pool, eventually
all the banks will have to agree that the prospects of the borrower are such
that uni…ed action is warranted. This common perception is more likely to
develop if borrower quality, as seen by the bank in our sample, is at the
lowest rating notch.
25Variable (1:i)( 1 :ii)
constant ¡:884
(:734)
¡3:588
(1:880)¤
log(#banks) :907
(:309)¤¤¤
:549
(:333)¤
skewness ¡2:150
(1:018)¤¤
¡1:725
(1:005)¤
rating6 1:225
(:508)¤¤
1:251
(:531)¤¤
hb ¡:246
(:369)
¡:151
(:355)
collateral ¡:193
(:513)
¡:354
(:515)
bank1 ¡:755
(:585)
¡
bank3 :826
(:724)
¡
bank4 ¡:367
(:491)
¡
bank5 ¡1:759
(:551)¤¤¤
¡1:546
(:419)¤¤¤
bank6 ¡:196
(:488)
¡
log(assets) ¡ :253
(:171)
engineering ¡ :480
(:412)
manuf ¡ :569
(:386)
time2end1_2 :344
(:378)
:491
(:377)
time2end3 :433
(:402)
:205
(:400)
obs 98 95
Mc Fadden R2 :298 :286
Table 11: Binary probit analysis of pool formation
Standard probit model. Dependent variable pool is equal to one if pool is formed
and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are measured at the distress event.
Standard errors in parentheses. Level of signi…cance: ***p=0.01, **p=0.05,
*p=0.1.
26The coe¢cient of the collateral-variable is negative as hypothesized
albeit not signi…cant. The housebank variable hb turns out to be insignif-
icant, too. This is remarkable as it suggests that housebanks are not the
driving force behind pool formation, at least in this sample. However, al-
though we do not observe it, it is likely that frequently there is a housebank
among the borrower’s alternative bank relationships.
Furthermore, bank identity plays a role in the formation of bank pools.
We …nd that bank 5 is rather resistant to pool formation compared to others,
its coe¢cient is signi…cantly negative at the 1% level. Industry dummies and
time2end-dummies measuring the time span after the distress event turn
out to be insigni…cant.
6.3 Determinants of workout success
6.3.1 Ordinary probit
To determine the success of a workout and the impact of a bank pool in
this context, we include all relationships in the sample for which at least
one period after the rating downgrade is observed. The …nal sample again
consists of 101 relationships. Our dependent variable shall di¤erentiate be-
tween successful and non-successful workouts. One way to operationalize
workout success relies on bank-internal corporate ratings. As explained ear-
lier, these ratings are expected to represent an unbiased estimate of borrower
default probability. The estimates emerge from the information acquired by
the bank through the relationship with its borrowers. We de…ne a workout
to be successful whenever, at the end of our observation window, the rating
has improved beyond the distress category. On our calibrated 1 to 6 rating
scale (best to worst), the notches 5 and 6 are reserved for distress, or junk
cases, while the notches 1 ¡ 4 are categorized as investment grade. Thus,
success describes a re-emergence of the distressed borrower as a healthy …rm
by obtaining an investment grade rating (notch 4 or better) during our ob-
servation period. The dependent variable will be labeled success,a n di s
equal to one if rating 4 or better has been achieved subsequent to the dis-
tress rating 5 or 6. The dummy equals zero otherwise. Note, a value of zero
does not necessarily imply that the workout has failed, and corporate assets
are liquidated. It may simply re‡ect the fact that the case has not yet been
resolved at the end of our observation window. Thus, the dependent variable
does not di¤erentiate between ”failure” and ”not yet resolved”. We have
chosen investment grade rating as our indicator of successful reorganization
because we believe that this is the best performance assessment available in
27our data. Though one might wish to use other data as well, e.g. the …rm’s
balance sheet data, these are typically not available in distress. The reason
is that distressed …rms may not provide timely accounting information. This
is evident from our data, where the number of missing or stale balance sheet
items becomes large after the initial distress event. Since banks do not stop
evaluating the borrower quality once the borrower is in distress and account-
ing data are poor, internal ratings provide the most reliable information for
indicating business success or business failure.
Explanatory variables in models (2) and (3) include the existence of a
bank pool and the number of bank relationships. The dummy pool is equal
to one if the relationship is embedded in a bank pool and zero if no pool is
observed. The variable #banks measures the number of bank relationships
of the client at the time of the distress event and will also serve as a proxy of
poolsize using the interaction term poolx#banks in model (2).R e c a l lt h a t
our #banks-variable measures the total number of currently active lending
relationships as reported in the banks’ credit …les. Thus, we cannot account
for the size of the pool per se. From conversations with bankers we know,
however, that under normal circumstances a bank pool comprises all relevant
…nancial institutions.
In order to test whether small and large pools have di¤erent e¤ects on
workout success, we replace pool in model (3) by two dummies, poolsma
and poolbig,w h e r epoolsma equals one whenever there is a pool and the
pool has at most 4 member banks. Analogously, poolbig is one when a pool
exists and the number of banks potentially involved is larger than 4.T h e
reference group here are all relationships where no pool has been formed.
Speci…cation (3), therefore, allows for a non-monotonic relationship between
pools on the probability of workout success.
Additionally, the set of explanatory variables include the housebank-
dummy hb (equal to one if the bank we observe is the housebank), rating6
measuring the severity of the distress shock, and two industry dummies for
engineering and manufacturing business. Since distress can start any time
within our window, we expect the success of a workout activity to display
some time dependency. The economic consequences of workout activities
will not be visible instantaneously, but probably need some time to unfold.
Thus, the variable time2end captures the time remaining from the onset of
distress until the end of our observation window. The reference group is 4 or
more years. Table 12 shows the results of the probit analysis.
SUCCESSi = fi
Ã
POOL;#BANKS;HB;RATING6
INDUSTRY;TIME2END
!
(2)
28SUCCESSii = fii
Ã
POOLSMA;POOLBIG;#BANKS;HB;
RATING6;I N D U S T R Y ; T I M E 2END
!
(3)
The results in Table 12 give a clear indication of the relevance of the pool
for the success of a workout. We ran two variants of the model. The …rst
described by equation (2) that included a pool dummy, the number of banks
and an interaction term of both. In the second, see equation (3), we included
small pools and large pools respectively viewed against relationships without
pools.
In the …rst model speci…cation (2) we …nd that the existence of a pool
has a signi…cantly positive impact on workout success. However, a higher
number of banks reduces this positive impact re‡ected in the interaction
of both variables. Both the pool d u m m ya sw e l la st h ei n t e r a c t i o nt e r m
poolx#banks are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level.
However, with model speci…cation (3) which di¤erentiates small pools vs.
large pools, it shows in a di¤erent way that the impact of the bank pool is
two-fold with respect to the number of banks involved. For small pools, the
impact on workout success is positive and for large pools with more than 4
banks involved the impact is negative both at the 1% level of signi…cance13.
Splitting the pool e¤ect by number of banks involved yields an important
result. Although the intention of bank pools is to facilitate workout, pools
are actually successful in doing so only if they are small. When pools have
many member banks, i.e. 5 or more, we …nd a negative pool e¤ect. Pools
now reduce the likelihood of workout success.
Besides these primary e¤ects, the housebank-dummy hb never turns out
to be signi…cant regarding the probability of workout success. Thus, a higher
relationship intensity does not translate into a more successful workout man-
agement. This observation is interesting in itself because it shows that the
presumed informational advantage of the housebank does not automatically
imply a special competency in restructuring the client. In fact, a result to
the contrary would have been puzzling, since once a workout is initiated, the
informational di¤erences between housebanks and other restructuring banks
become blurred.
Furthermore, rating6 does not explain the probability of workout suc-
cess either. The two industries we controlled for have positive but insignif-
icant signs. Firm size does not explain much, too. The two time2end-
dummies are insigni…cant in both speci…cations.
13Coe¢cient of poolbig is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level in model
speci…cation (3:ii) which controls for size and industry.
29Variable (2) (3:i)( 3 :ii)
constant ¡:500
(:470)
¡:255
(:445)
1:119
(1:822)
pool 4:715
(1:309)¤¤¤
¡¡
poolsma ¡ 1:312
(:462)¤¤¤
1:178
(:484)¤¤
poolbig ¡¡ 1:665
(:504)¤¤¤
¡1:638
(:510)¤¤¤
#banks :067
(:057)
:038
(:052)
:028
(:058)
poolx#banks ¡1:041
(:295)¤¤¤
¡¡
hb ¡:260
(:337)
¡:358
(:332)
¡:379
(:354)
rating6 ¡:798
(:585)
¡:486
(:523)
¡:415
(:536)
log(asset) ¡¡ ¡ :132
(:167)
engineering ¡¡ :269
(:404)
manufacturing ¡¡ :365
(:409)
time2end1_2 ¡:108
(:365)
¡:291
(:371)
¡:312
(:388)
time2end3 :104
(:402)
:029
(:392)
:029
(:402)
obs 100 100 97
Mc Fadden R2 :278 :269 :285
Table 12: Ordinary probit analysis of workout success
Standard probit model. Dependent variable success is equal to one if rating im-
proves to investment grade (1-4) and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are
measured at the distress event. Standard errors in parentheses. Level of signi…-
cance: ***p=0.01, **p=0.05, *p=0.1.
306.3.2 Two-stage estimation
Since the pool variable is endogenous, we cannot rule out the possibility that
it may be correlated with the error terms in models (2) or (3) respectively. In
this case the coe¢cients in our success-estimation would be inconsistent. A
way to estimate model (3) consistently is suggested by Maddala [1983]. Our
model is similar to the following system of equations, where y¤
1 describes the
probability of pool formation which is observed as a dummy y1.T h ev a r i a b l e
y¤
2 describes the probability of workout success, observed as a dummy y2 as
well.
y¤
1 = °0
1x1 + "1 (4)
y¤
2 = ¯
0
2y1 + °0
2x2 + "2 (5)
There will be two stages of estimation. We take the probit on pool for-
mation (1:ii) in the previous section as the …rst stage (equation (4)). We
then use the estimated probability of pool formation to recalculate the vari-
ables d poolsma and d poolbig. With respect to the model, we then replace
y1 by ©(°0
1x1),n a m e l yt h ev a r i a b l e s d poolsma and d poolbig , and estimate
equation (5) as a probit or, similar, reestimate model (3:i) now based on the
estimated probability of a pool formation. The results of the second stage
are documented in Table 13.
It is apparent from Table 13 that the results reported earlier are robust
with respect to a possible endogeneity problem. The coe¢cient of poolbig
is negative and the coe¢cient of poolsma is positive. Both coe¢cients are
signi…cant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. We therefore conclude that
the probability of workout success is a positive function of the existence of
a bank pool when the number of pool banks is small and the e¤ect becomes
negative when more than 4 banks are involved.
6.3.3 Duration analysis
In determining the probability of workout success, we have so far used two
time2end-dummy variables controlling for e¤ects of the length of the ob-
servation window succeeding the distress event. The underlying hypothesis
states that the probability of workout success positively depends on the time
span observed. However, these dummies turn out to be insigni…cant.
It is tempting, therefore, to employ a duration model analyzing workout
time on a monthly basis. It speci…es workout success using the time spent
in distress. The set of explanatory variables coincides with the preceding
31Variable (5)
constant ¡:570
(:469)
d poolsma 1:305
(:454)¤¤¤
d poolbig ¡:792
(:398)¤¤
#banks :040
(:052)
hb ¡:189
(:320)
rating6 ¡:646
(:481)
time2end1-2 ¡:100
(:358)
time2end3 :399
(:388)
obs 95
Mc Fadden R2 :171
Table 13: Two-stage regression of workout success (second-stage results)
Standard probit model. Dependent variable success is equal to one if rating im-
proves to investment grade (1-4) and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables include
instruments on behalf of poolsma and poolbig calculated from (1.ii) regression re-
sults. Standard errors in parentheses. Level of signi…cance: ***p=0.01, **p=0.05,
*p=0.1.
32Variable Coe¤
constant 3:894
(:306)¤¤¤
poolsma ¡:532
(:271)¤¤
poolbig :945
(:439)¤¤
#banks ¡:023
(:040)
hb :115
(:238)
rating6 :597
(:379)
obs 100
percentiles of survival
survival 0:95 0:75 0:50
time (months) 10:83 30:08 50:65
Table 14: Duration regression of workout success
Duration model using Weibull distribution. Dependent variable durmon equals
the time spent in distress measured in months, i.e. the time between the distress
event and the rating upgrade to rating class 1-4. Standard errors in parentheses.
Level of signi…cance: ***p=0.01, **p=0.05, *p=0.1.
probit regression (3:i). The coe¢cients are expected to have opposite signs
compared to the previous probits since the dependent variable is a reverse
measure of success. A workout is more successful when recovery is reached
in a shorter time period. Thus, the duration model formulates the time di-
mension of success more explicit than the probit regressions discussed above.
We included the explanatory variables of equation (3) as covariates. The
duration model was speci…ed as a loglinear survival model with an underlying
Weibull distribution. It yields the following results.
The estimation results support the …ndings of the probit estimation on
workout success presented above. The coe¢cients of both variables, poolsma
and poolbig, have the expected signs and both are signi…cantly di¤erent
from zero at the 5%-level. Besides, we …nd that 95% of all cases spend at
least 10 months in distress, 75% of …rms spend 30 months or more in distress
whereas the median is 50 months.
337C o n c l u s i o n
While the distress of corporate borrowers has always been an important topic
in …nancial economics, the more speci…c question of how the debt structure, in
particular with multiple lenders, a¤ects the performance of distressed …rms
has not yet received much attention. In an in‡uential paper Bolton and
Scharfstein [1996] have emphasized that the determination of optimal debt
structure is governed by expectations about the costs and bene…ts of multiple
lending. With many lenders, recontracting may be costly or even impossible
in distress situations (liquidity default). Morris and Shin [1999] have stressed
a di¤erent factor that renders multiple lending costly. In their model, …rms
face the risk of a run on their assets. Ine¢cient liquidations of …rms can only
be avoided if creditors can rely upon an e¤ective coordination device. Thus,
whatever the bene…ts of multiple lending, its costs clearly derive from the
con‡icting interests of many lenders vis-à-vis a cash constrained, distressed
borrower.
In this paper, we explore empirically the common pool hypothesis under-
lying the above argument. We make use of a unique data set which contains
detailed …rst-hand credit-…le information on bank behavior in corporate dis-
tress and on corporate performance thereafter. The major contribution of
our study concerns the identi…cation of bank pools as viable and relevant
contractual arrangements. We show that bank pools a¤ect the probability of
workout success. The sign of this impact depends on pool size. Small pools
(number of member banks below the median) signi…cantly increase the prob-
ability of workout success, while large pools tend to reduce the likelihood of
success. This …nding supports the view that the bene…t of pool formation, the
exclusion of a run on …rm assets, has to be traded o¤ against the negotiation
costs among pool members. These costs tend to increase with pool size. The
probability of workout success, therefore, …rst rises and then falls with pool
size. The single-peaked workout success function squares well with reports
from practitioners who claim that large pools are a nightmare, while small
pools seem to operate more smoothly. We have made several attempts to
check the robustness of these …ndings. Di¤erent model speci…cations as well
as a two-stage estimation, controlling for endogeneity of the pool variable,
all lead to the same conclusions. Furthermore, a duration analysis that sub-
stitutes the length of time spent in distress as an alternative success criterion
identi…es the same factors as signi…cant as the standard probit estimation.
The formation of a bank pool is therefore an important decision, requiring
an initial attempt to coordinate the interests of several lenders. In particu-
lar, lenders have to be convinced that they will bene…t individually from not
terminating the relationship with the borrower right away. We have mod-
34eled the decision to form a bank pool, which is more likely, according to
our results, when the number of banks is large and …rm quality is hit by a
substantial shock, according to the initial distress rating. Furthermore, the
distribution of …nancing shares among banks capturing free-riding problems
has a signi…cant impact on the probability of pool formation. Finally, the
housebank is not a driving force behind pool formation. This stands in con-
trast to earlier …ndings relating to the special role that housebanks play in
normal times, i.e. in non-distress periods.
Several open issues emerge from this study. First, we do not have any
information about the dynamics of pool formation. In particular, we do not
know what exactly triggers the initiation of the pool, and its stability over
time. This is a potentially important issue, since bank pools are a real-world
example of a workable solution to the collective action problem.
Understanding the strengths and weaknesses in a free contracting envi-
ronment may shed light on the construction of workable regulatory solutions
in other areas of application. A …rst step into explaining why bank pools
emerge builds on two major characteristics of the German insolvency code,
which stand in sharp contrast to the rules of the US bankruptcy code (Chap-
ter 11). The old German insolvency code existed until January 1999, i.e.
throughout our entire sample period. Court-supervised proceedings could
take one of two routes, compulsory liquidation (”Konkursverfahren”), or set-
tlement (”Vergleichsverfahren”), although the latter has only rarely been
chosen. In both cases, control is shifted from the owner-manager to a trustee
who is empowered and supervised by the court. There are two important
di¤erences to the US code, Chapter 11 in particular. First, debt seniority is
respected throughout the proceedings, giving privately negotiated arrange-
ments, especially collateral rights, a true value. Second, the old German
code does not stipulate an automatic stay, i.e. a period in which creditors
are barred from liquidating their claims, and management can attempt to re-
organize the …rm. Notably the …rst aspect, the unconditional acceptance of
debt seniority rules, has profound implications for the relationship between
borrowers and lenders. It allows creditors to enter into a private contract
that stipulates the pooling of claims and cash ‡ows with no fear of unilateral
breach of contract, or of free-riding. The structure of the insolvency code
therefore o¤ers an explanation of why bank pools can reach stable arrange-
ments among all members. Furthermore, the respect of debt seniority rules
by the courts explains why lenders are jointly willing to invest fresh money
for workout investments into a distressed company. The common usage of
bank pool arrangements to engineer workouts also helps to explain why there
are so very few workout activities once a …rm has …led for bankruptcy. The
reason is that all serious workout attempts that receive support from the
35lenders are carried out well before the initiation of formal bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. If this interpretation is correct, a common criticism of the German
Konkursordnung, namely its poor workout incentives, is in fact misplaced.
The broader view that is supported by our …ndings stresses the strong pre-
bankruptcy workout incentives embedded in the old code. The code supports
timely lender coordination and pool formation, activities which would prob-
ably not be supported in a more debtor-friendly legal environment.
It is noteworthy that the above mentioned criticism of the former Konkur-
sordnung has convinced the legislator in Germany to change the bankruptcy
code. The new code became e¤ective on January 1, 1999. It is intended to
improve the old code by allowing an early start of court proceedings when
illiquidity is imminent, and by facilitating the reorganization of the …rm. The
new code blends elements of the old, creditor-friendly Konkursordnung with
an US style, debtor-oriented code. It allows for considerable ‡exibility regard-
ing possible arrangements among creditors. Since it holds on to respecting
individual creditor rights, the basic motivation to form a bank pool is likely
to remain intact under the new code. However, the observance of creditor
rights is no longer unconditional. Expected illiquidity as a criterion to …le for
bankruptcy marks the entry into a debtor-friendly system. This may weaken
the pool formation incentives of lenders, and it may thereby scale down the
willingness to engage in joint workout processes. Cross-country evidence us-
ing data from …rms operating under di¤erent insolvency regimes is needed in
order to understand more fully the extent to which debt restructuring and
workouts are in‡uenced by the microstructure of bankruptcy legislation.
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40Appendix
1 Standard pool contract -
Abbreviated English version
The Creditor Pool contract is to be agreed upon as a non-trading partnership
between the Pool leader (Bank A),
Bank B,
Bank C,
...
and the company (borrower), as well as third party debtors.
§1 Credit Facilities
¢ Listing of credit lines granted by the contact for each bank and type of
credit concerned.
¢ The banks agree to uphold the credit lines for the duration of the contract.
Reductions or deletions shall only occur by mutual consent. This does not
hold for credit commitments granted outside the pool.
§2 Collateral
¢ Listing of
1a) collateral furnished by the company to the banks and collateral to be
furnished per bank.
1b) collateral to be furnished by the company in favor of the pool leader and
each individual bank simultaneously and with equal ranking.
2a) collateral furnished by third party debtors to the banks and collateral to
be furnished per bank.
2b) collateral to be furnished by third party debtors in favor of the pool
leader and of each bank simultaneously and with equal ranking.
¢ In the event that a speci…c bank in the future is to be is furnished with
collateral with regard to one of the credit lines cited in §1, then this shall
considered to be part of the pool contract.
¢ In the event that a bank extends additional credit, then the collateral fur-
nished in this context shall also be included in the pool contract but shall
serve primarily to repay these additional credit facilities.
¢ The company can furnish collateral to third parties only after having in-
structed the banks of its intention.
§3 Collateral Purpose
41¢ Company collateral as well as that of third party debtors serves to secure
existing and future bank claims arising from the granting of credits cited in
§1.
§4 Retransfer/Collateral Release
¢ When all claims have been satis…ed in accordance with §3, then the banks
are required to retransfer to the company and third party debtors collateral
against which no claims have been made.
¢ Pool collateral must be partially or wholly released if its realizable value
more than temporarily exceeds __% of the secured claims.
§5 Trust Relationship/Collateral Administration
¢ The Pool leader administers in a …duciary capacity for the other banks the
collateral collected within this contract.
¢ The release of collateral requires the consent of all the banks.
§6 Realization
¢ The Pool leader realizes in its own name the collateral cited in §2 for the
banks’ account.
¢ When and whether collateral is to be realized is decided by the banks in
mutual consent.
§7 Balance Settlement
¢ As far as possible the company is to draw upon the credit lines cited in §1
equally.
¢ The banks are committed in the event of realization and as requested at
any time by a speci…c bank to bring into line via transfer entries that part
of their credit utilization which does not exceed the credit lines cited in §1,
such that it corresponds to that of the credit lines.
§8 Revenue Distribution
¢ Revenue deriving from the realization of collateral is to be utilized accord-
ing to the following order of priorities:
a) costs, taxes and other expenses incurred during the administration and
realization of collateral, Pool leader remuneration,
b) repayment of the banks’ credit demands in accordance with §1 in equal
proportion to the utilization after the balance settlement,
c) repayment of those claims exceeding the credit lines in equal ranking with
the excesses,
d) repayment of the bank’s additional credits in equal ranking to the uti-
lization as long as this has not been ascribed to the utilization of separately
42furnished collateral,
e) the satisfying of other bank claims in equal ranking with the ratio of these
claims.
¢ The banks are entitled to alter the distribution key.
¢ Any revenue ensuing, which is not needed, is to be paid over to the company
or the third party creditors respectively.
§9 Costs, Taxes, Remuneration
¢ All costs and taxes deriving from this Pool contract, particularly those from
the administration or any realization, are to be borne by the company.
¢ In the event that these costs and taxes are not paid by the company, then
they shall be borne by the banks in keeping with the credit lines cited in §1.
§10 Brie…ng
¢ The banks are to inform each other reciprocally when circumstances become
known, which may persistently endanger a repayment of the credit lines cited
in §1.
¢ The banks are required to provide one another on request with information
about both debts outstanding to the company and collateral. The banks are
exempted from banking secrecy.
§11 Deadlines and Notice of Termination
¢ The Pool contract is to be drawn up for an unspeci…ed duration.
¢ Each bank is entitled to terminate the contract with three months notice
at the end of a calendar quarter. The Pool contract will continue with the
remaining banks.
¢ In the event of notice being served, the banks are reserved the right of dis-
tribution with respect to collateral relating to special agreements.
¢ At the request of any bank a settlement of balance must be undertaken
when the bank which has served notice quits.
¢ The company and third party creditors may only quit this contract after
all obligations from §1 have been met.
§12 Place of Ful…llment and Jurisdiction, and Applicable Law
§13 Contract Amendments and Supplements
§14 Escape Clause
432 Rating standardization
Standardized Rating 
Category
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
1
outstanding quality
1
very good risk
1
outstanding quality
1.0 - 1.2 
outstanding quality, 
low risk
1
outstanding perfor-
mance, lowest risk
1.00 - 1.49
outstanding quality
A+, A
minimum risk, 
2
good quality, 
above average
2
good risk
2
good quality
1.3 - 2.7 
good quality, 
above average
2
high quality, 
above average
1.50 - 2.49
good quality
A-, B+
low risk
3
average quality, 
increased risk
3 - 3/4
satisfactory/ adequate 
risk
3
satisfactory quality 
with weaknesses
2.8 - 3.7
average quality/risk
3
average performance
2.50 - 2.99
satisfactory quality
B, B-
satisfactory risk
4
speculative grade, 
below average quality
4
sufficient risk
4
sufficient quality, 
intensive care
3.8 - 4.2
speculative grade, 
intensive care
4 - 5
sufficient quality, 
increased risk
3.00 - 3.49
sufficient quality
C+, C
high risk, problematic
5
problematic, intensive 
care, reorg.
4/5 - 5
just sufficient / 
insufficient risk
5
deficient quality, 
substantial problems
4.3 - 5.7
default imminent, 
intensive care/reorg.
6 - 7
intensive care, 
weak/neg. prospects
3.50 - 4.49
low quality
C-
very high risk, 
insufficient quality
6
default, 
reorg./liquidation
6
extremely bad risk
6 - 7
inadequate quality, 
default
5.8 - 6.5
default, 
reorg./liquidation
8
default, operating 
loss, neg. prospects
4.50 - 5.00
default or imminent 
default
D
extremely high risk / 
default, neg. prospect
Table 15: Rating standardization (numbering of banks doesn’t correspond
with other tables and …gures in this paper)
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Figure 2: Frequency distributions of internal ratings after standardization ,
year 1996
443L i s t o f v a r i a b l e s
abbreviation description
success dummy, equals one if …rm rating improves (·4) after distress event
durmon duration of distress [time betw. distress event and re-emergence, months]
banki dummy, equals one if the …rm’s credit …les are observed at banki
#banks number of …rm’s bank relationships
pool dummy, equals one if bank pool exists
poolsma (poolbig) dummy, equals one if bank pool exists and number of bank ·4(>4)
poolx#banks interaction between pool and #banks
skewness abs. value of deviation of bank’s true debt share from proportional share
rating6 dummy, equals one if the initial distress rating is 6 on transformed scale
hb dummy, equals one if observed bank is housebank
collateral percentage of bank’s loans secured by collateralized assets
log(asset) log of asset value [in DM1,000]
engineering dummy, equals one if …rm belongs to engineering sector
manufacturing dummy, equals one if …rm belongs to manufacturing sector
time2end1-2 (time2end3) dummy, equals one if no. of observation years after distress event ·2( = 3 )
Table 16: List of variables
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